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LAW, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ALICE ERH-SOON TAY' and EUGENE KAMENKA5
China, the conventional wisdom has it, is not and has never been a
law-oriented culture. It elevates personal relationships and moral du-
ties tied to such relationships against abstract, impersonal laws or
rights.
1. Challis Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney. Professor Tay was
born in Singapore in 1934 and educated at Raffles Girls' School, Singapore, Lincoln's Inn
and The Australian National University, where she took her doctorate with a thesis on
'The Concept of Possession in the Common Law,' She has practiced in criminal law and
lectured in law in the (then) University of Malaya in Singapore and the Australian Na-
tional University, anA been a visiting research worker and Visiting Professor, on various
occasions, in the United States, the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany. She is
the author of articles on common law, jurisprudence, comparative law, Soviet law and
Chinese law, and of several contributions to the Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, besides
being co-author, with her husband, Eugene Kamenka, of a forthcoming study, Marxism
and the Theory of Law. She is an Executive Member of the International Association for
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy and served as President of the Association's
Extraordinary World Congress held in Sydney and Canberra in 1977.
2. Professor of the History of Ideas in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Aus-
tralian National University and has been (in 1973, 1974 and 1976) Visiting Professor in
the Faculty of Law in the University of Sydney. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the
Social Sciences in Australia and Fellow of the Secretary of the Australian Academy of
the Humanities. Born in Cologne in 1928, Professor Kamenka was educated in Australia
in the Sydney Technical High School, the University of Sydney and the Australian Na-
tional University. He has worked and taught in Israel, England, Germany, the United
States, Canada, the USSR and Signapore. His books include The Ethical Foundations of
Marxism (1962), Marxism and Ethics (1969) and The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach
(1970). He has edited A World in Revolution? (1970), Paradigm for Revolution? The
Paris Commune 1871-1971 (1972), Nationalism-The Nature and Evolution of an Idea
(1973), and with R. S. Neale, Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (1975).
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This view of society lies at the heart of Confucianism-the state-
supported philosophy that for nearly two thousand years has shaped
Chinese administration and the moral and social attitudes of the Chi-
nese people to a remarkable extent. "If people be led by laws," Confu-
cius wrote in a passage every educated Chinese used to know by heart,
"and uniformity is sought to be given them by punishments, they will
try to avoid punishments but have no sense of shame. If they be led by
virtue and uniformity sought to be given them by 1i [ritual, protecting
the social order and thus involving moral propriety, "correct beha-
viour"], they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, will become
good." The notion that strong reliance on fa or positive law is evidence
of a breakdown in the social order, and a lack of harmony between the
state and society, is deeply ingrained in traditional Chinese thinking.
So is the notion that social harmony is threatened, rather than pro-
moted, by emphasis on the individual as a separate, walled-in unit,
having "his" or "her" rights. The (morally) superior person guided by
1i will be ready to adjust his conception of his rights to the needs and
demands of others, to avoid hostile confrontation, and to prove moral
superiority by being prepared to yield (rang). A social ethic oriented
towards mediation and compromise, toward recognizing the extent to
which another person's emotions and dignity are involved in his claim,
rather than toward the abstract question of the justice of his claim, is
likely to avoid any clear, uncompromising definition of rights or claims
ab initio. Where Western legal procedure tends to depersonalize claims
in order to bring out more sharply the question at issue, Chinese tradi-
tion personalizes all claims, seeing them in the context of a social
human relationship. It thus rejects the notion that a sharp legal dis-
tinction or a formal legal pronouncement can by itself resolve the dis-
pute between the parties by re-establishing harmony and mutual re-
spect. It treats justice as above all a form of fireside equity. Confucian
writings abound in such statements as "It is the judgment and not the
law which makes justice," "The ancient kings deliberated on circum-
stances in deciding." In personal and business relationships, less so in
politics, these attitudes still flourish in the People's Republic of China
today. They can be felt in the Chinese businessman's and official's reli-
ance on personal mutual respect and good faith, in the subordinate role
ascribed to written contracts or agreements and in the Chinese readi-
ness, even at the level of statecraft, to play things by ear, to accumu-
late ad hoc experience first, and to legislate or make rules only slowly,
vaguely, imprecisely and flexibly.
The notion that written laws and defined rights will polarize
human relationships and intensify disputes, forms the substance of the
famous criticism, by a high dignitary of a neighboring feudal state, of
[Vol. 7
LEGAL EDUCATION IN PRC
the action of Zichan, Prime Minister of the State of Zheng, who in 536
B.C. ordered a penal code inscribed on a set of bronze vessels. The
objection, reported in the Zuo zhuan history probably compiled in the
third century B.C., ran:
When the people know what the penalties are, they lose their
fear of authority and acquire a contentiousness which causes
them to make their appeal to the written words, on the chance
that this will bring them success . . . . As soon as the people
know the grounds on which to conduct disputation, they will
reject the accepted ways of behaviour (ii) and make their ap-
peal to the written word, arguing to the last over the tip of an
awl or knife. Disorderly litigations will multiply and bribery
will become current. By the end of your era, Zheng will be ru-
ined. I have heard it said that a state which is about to perish
is sure to have many governmental regulations.3
If China was a society that elevated morality above law, and fused
the two, it was also a society with a highly developed and complex bu-
reaucracy and system of administration. The foreigner is likely to
grossly underestimate the volume, the antiquity and the systematic de-
tail of legislation, codification, legal commentary and legal treatises
published under the Emperors of China. Although the full texts of the
earlier "books of punishments" promulgated in the feudal states from
536 B.C. onward and the penal code of the Han Dynasty (promulgated
circa 200 B.C.) have been lost, we do have the sequence of dynastic
penal codes from the last Tang Code of 651 A.D., containing 502 arti-
cles, to the Qing (Manchu) Code, compiled in its definitive form in
1740 A.D., arranged in 436 statutes with 1,409 supplementary regula-
tions which grew in number to 1,892 by 1870 A.D. Besides this, there
are the legal chapters in the dynastic histories, compendia of law cases,
including a case from 1211 A.D." and legal sections in various encyclo-
paedic compilations of governmental institutions. The vast body of
Chinese sub-legal rules and customs (clan rules, guild rules and regula-
tions, village and gentry councils, etc.) is difficult to study with preci-
sion because of the scattered nature of the material and the informal
method of operation.5 The literature on formal Chinese law, on the
3. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 16-17 (1967) (modified version of
the Legge translation).
4. See PARALLEL CASES UNDER THE PEAR TREE, (trans. van Gulik). This book has
been translated into English by the Dutch scholar-diplomat Robert van Gulik, who drew
the plots of several of his Judge Dee detective stories from it, even though Dee was a
judge of the Tang Dynasty, judicially active around £E,-690 A.D.)
5. Recently, sociologists and anthropologists have tended to follow Max Weber and
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other hand as Professor Bodde puts it,' "is large in quantity, fairly
readily available, and covers a longer time span than that of any other
present-day political entity." The voluminous codes of each dynasty
particularly from the Tang onward, present us with a much fuller for-
mal record of legal and social development than any we have for Euro-
pean nations over a comparable period. The two great codes of the
Qing Dynasty-the Da Qing Lu Li and the Da Qing Hui Dian, the first
a code of punishments listing 3,987 punishable offenses covering all ar-
eas of social life and systematically arranged and analyzed, and the
latter a constitutional or administrative code creating a highly complex
and developed system of administrative government with the functions
of departments and duties and powers of officers clearly deline-
ated-aroused great admiration in eighteenth and early nineteeth-cen-
tury Europe. They were translated into Russian on the orders of the
Empress Catherine the Great and into English and French half a cen-
tury later. With regular revisions they remained the governing law of
China until the Westernizing legal reforms initiated in the last years of
the Qing Dynasty and enacted only after the Revolution of 1911. Com-
plex and sophisticated as these codes were, however, they created no
rights of citizens, no general legal framework independent of the state,
no body of civil law distinguished from crime. They were instructions
to officials. Any case brought before such officials in the courts had to
end in a punishment, even if only a reprimand-either to one party for
doing wrong or to the other for bringing a baseless complaint. The
function of laws was not to sustain social harmony by providing a
framework for normal action, but to strike terror in the hearts of those
who breached such harmony. A man sought legal redress at his peril.
7
Eugene Ehrlich in emphasizing that the formal (state) laws of a society form only a small
portion of the rules or laws by which men live. In the Chinese case this emphasis is
particularly pertinent. See, e.g., Pospisil, Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Sys-
tems in Human Societies, 11 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUrTION 2 (1967), in which the author
argues that recognition of a multiplicity of legal systems and levels within Chinese (as
within any other) society, and hence of the subjection of the individual to many "laws"
of many groups, enables us to turn the confusing and unpredictable pattern of Chinese
behavior into a fascinating interplay of structural units and their jural relationships. Id.
6. See BODDE & MoRas, supra note 3, at 7.
7. The Kangxi Emperor (one of the best-known of the early Qing emperors) sug-
gested, in reply to a memorial, that this was deliberate policy "Law-suits would tend to
increase to a frightful amount, if people were not afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt
confident of always finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude
himself concerning his own interests, contests would then be interminable, and the half
of the Empire would not suffice to settle the law-suits of the other half. I desire, there-
fore, that those who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any pity
and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear
before a magistrate." For a fuller account of law in Imperial China, see BODDE AND MOR-
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The Qing Dynasty fell in 1911 under the onslaught of a nationalist
and democratic revolution led by Sun Yat-sen and based on European-
Continental and Anglo-American constitutional, legal and political
models, that were ultimately enshrined in the Six (Western-style)
Codes of the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen himself had also toyed, after
1917, with Soviet models of party structure and political education,
which have remained overwhelmingly strong in the People's Republic
of China but which are also felt in Taiwan. Basically, however, the pe-
riod from 1911 to 1949 was a period of unresolved civil war, compli-
cated and made more humiliating by Japanese invasion.
Where Soviet Russian Communisn initially came to power in a sin-
gle coup in the capital, based primarily on industrial workers, Chinese
Communism came to power in the countryside, over an extended pe-
riod during which it galvanized groups of rebellious and displaced
peasants into an Army of Liberation sponsoring local peasant Soviets
and a rebel Soviet Republic. From 1921-when a small group of intel-
lectuals met in Shanghai in what was later dubbed "the First National
Congress of the Communist Party of China"-until 1927, the Party not
only followed the Comintern-sponsored policy of a united front with
the Kuomintang (KMT), but it also actively organized revolutionary
peasants in Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Fujian. In the period
from 1926 to 1927, when increasing tension culminated in Chiang Kai-
shek's repudiation of the united front with the Communists, Commu-
nist Soviets were set up in these areas, acting as local rebel govern-
ments, introducing social and economic reforms, suppressing landlords
and "counter-revolutionaries." To these Soviets, as to members of the
Chinese Communist party (CCP) generally, law was what it was to
Lenin-"the programme of the Party uttered in the language of
power;" the will of the new ruling class backed by physical sanctions; a
means of propaganda and of social transformation. Between 1926 and
1931, at the time that the Kuomintang Government was undertaking
its most important program of (Western-style) law codification,' the
Communist Soviets were establishing and enforcing their own system
of "revolutionary justice," combining simple decrees with popular ter-
ror. The Soviets issued decrees and regulations establishing land re-
forms, reducing interest rates, prohibiting gambling and opium smok-
ing and safeguarding the rights of women. They also initiated
campaigns against "local bullies, bad gentry and law-breaking land-
RIS, supra note 3, and for a briefer summary and reference to other authorities, see A.E.-
S. Tay, Law in Communist China-Part I, 6 SYDNEY LAW REviEw 153, 155-62 (1969).
8. Law reform influenced by Western forms and ideals began in the last years of the
Qing Dynasty. See Tao, 'Shen Chia-pen and Modernization of Chinese Law', 25 JouR-
NAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, 275 (1976).
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lords." Law, for them, was intimately connected with military and rev-
olutionary activity, with class struggle rather than with with the foun-
dations of a stable society, with mobilization rather than the settled
life. Justice, in this period, was almost entirely popular and informal.
Landlords and other "counterrevolutionaries" were tried by special
tribunals (ad hoc courts or gatherings) which often inflicted corporal
punishment on the accused and arranged humiliating parades and
"struggle meetings." It was later admitted that this period saw many
abuses and excesses, including arbitrary arrest, corporal punishment
and the use of torture to obtain confessions.' Judicial procedure, crude
as it may have been, was on the whole regarded as a weapon against
counter-revolutionaries; disputes among "loyal comrades" or genuine
peasants and workers were handled as matters for informal mediation,
with military leaders and party cadres replacing the traditional elder.
The "Yan~n period" of Chinese Communism from 1935-1945, de-
spite the periods of comparative co-existence with the Kuomintang re-
mained in essence a period of grassroots revolutionary activity, contin-
uing and developing the judicial and political attitudes shaped in the
period of the local Soviets and the Central Soviet Republic. The char-
acteristic features of much subsequent Chinese Communist legal ad-
ministration - the welding together of political, administrative and
judicial interests through judicial committees operating at all levels of
the court hierarchy; the familiarization of party and government per-
sonnel, including the procurators, with court problems and decisions;
the use of trials as forms of propaganda; the involvement of the masses
in judicial decision through elected assessors and mass and on-the-spot
trials; the fostering of conciliation under Party guidance; the emphasis
on repentance and reform-were taking ever more definite shape.
These features represented an interesting blend of revolutionary Marx-
ist and popular traditional Chinese attitudes and concerns. Vacillations
in policy were primarily reflections of the external situation, that is
reflections of the shifts from militant rebellion to united front policies
and of the changes in the security of the "red areas." Beneath this,
however, lay a more fundamental "contradiction"-a marked tension
between the extreme politicization and popularization of law, openly
proclaimed, on the one hand, and a concern with formal legality, the
9. These were the "mistakes" enumerated in Instruction No. 6 of December, 1931
issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic formed in
that year. Mao Zedong, in his writing from the Hunan period, admitted bluntly that "it
was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area." See Mao, I
SELECTED WORKS 26-27 (1954). These mistakes were justified with slogans that have sub-
sequently become well-known: "a revolution is not a dinner party".and "a wrong cannot
be righted without the proper limits being exceeded." Id.
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formation of legal cadres and the professionalization of legal work, on
the other.
With the Allied victory in World War II, the "Yanfn period" and
the united front with the Kuomintang came to an end. The CCP set
out to conquer China. This campaign in many ways reinforced the con-
tradiction we have noted: it led, on the one hand, to a renewed wave of
violence against counter-revolutionaries and landlords in newly-occu-
pied areas; it led, on the other, to Communist assurances that the
Party stood for the rule of law and welcomed all those ready to join in
the new democratic order. Thus in April, 1946, Lin Boqu, in a report to
the People's Political Council of the Xinjian-Jiangsu-Ningxia Border
Region, stressed the importance of judicial independence and of prose-
cuting citizens regardless of their official or Party position for any ille-
gal acts they might commit. The policy regarding "war criminals,
counterrevolutionaries and enemy agents" was "to punish the principal
offenders, to pardon those forced to join in counter-revolutionary activ-
ities and to reward those who have established merit." No leniency,
however, was to be shown to major offenders; no statute of limitations
was to apply to them. In fact, the campaign against landlords and
counter-revolutionary elements between 1945 and 1949 (and later)
again revived the early ad hoc special tribunals and mass trials, making
full use of popular justice, "struggle meetings," and accusation rallies.
In 1946, the number of such meetings and trials ran into the hundreds
of thousands, with millions of people taking part. Violence and terror
were used freely; torture, corporal punishment, manhandling by the
crowds and on-the-spot public executions were frequent occurrences.
As more and more areas came under Communist control during the
1945-49 civil war, "people's courts' were set up in the "liberated areas"
on a regional basis, at county or municipal, provincial and regional
level. Each court had, as before, a judicial committee attached to it.
Composed of judges, administrative officials, Party cadres and repre-
sentatives of popular organizations, this judicial committee discussed
and decided important cases and acted as the main vehicle of Party
control. The "experienced" cadres of the Border Regions were in heavy
demand to fill judicial and Party posts in the "liberated" areas. The
enormous shortage of judicial personnel forced the Communists to re-
tain some former Kuomintang officials, especially in the cities, and to
vest, in one and the same person, the chairmanship of the local peo-
ple's government and of the local people's court.
In February, 1949, with complete control for the mainland in sight,
the Central Committee of the CCP declared that the work of the peo-
ple's judiciary should not be based on the Kuomintang's Six Codes but
should be based on new people's laws. Two months later a directive of
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the North China Government repeated that the Six Codes and all reac-
tionary laws "designed to preserve the domination of the feudal land-
lords, compradors and bureaucratic bourgeoisie and to suppress the re-
sistance of the broad masses of the people" were abolished.'0
Communist laws, decrees and codes were recognized to be few and in-
adequate. The People's Courts were directed to guide themselves by
the programmes, laws, orders, regulations and resolutions promulgated
by the People's Government and the People's Liberation Army, as well
as by the policy embodied in the New Democracy." Regional authori-
ties, in fact, issued directives and provisional regulations which pro-
vided some form of legal order for the "liberated areas," covering pol-
icy and organizational matters, public security and judicial work,
regulating court procedure and prohibiting torture, and indiscriminate
killing. In Shanghai, for instance, the Municipal People's Court on Au-
gust 11, 1949, promulgated provisional regulations on civil and criminal
procedure. They contained provisions for mediation, appeal, public
trial, lay assessors, the right of defence and disqualification of judicial
officials on ground of interest. Article 10 of the Regulations stipulated
that "in rendering judgment special attention must be given to the col-
lection of all possible evidence and the combination of investigative
and analytic work on the case." More general regulations on judicial
procedure, and general principles of law published by the North China
Government pointed out that punishment was to educate and reform
criminals and not to seek revenge or to humiliate and torture the of-
fenders. All death sentences imposed by the lower courts were to be
sent to the North China Supreme Court for review and to the chair-
man of the North China Government for final approval.12 In the hour
of victory, moderation and the rule of law were re-emphasized, in
words at least. The People's Liberation Army in April, 1949, promised
protection to the life and property of every individual except war
criminals, and to all privately-owned factories, stores, banks, ware-
houses, vessels, wharves and the like, except those "controlled by bu-
reaucratic capital." Another policy directive issued by the North China
People's Government stated:
The people shall enjoy without interference freedom of speech,
publication, assembly, association, belief, travel, and change of
10. See North China People's Government, 1 FALING HUIBIAN (COLLECTION OF LAWS
AND DIRECTIVES) 181 (1949) 10. DmECTVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMirrEE OF THE CCP OF
FEBRUARY, 1949 and INSTRUCTION OF THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CHINA OF
APRIL 1, 1949.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 184.
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domicile; they shall also have guarantees for the safety and
freedom of their person. Except judicial and public security or-
gans, carrying out their duties according to the law, no other
organs, military units, groups or individuals may arrest, im-
prison, try to punish any person.'
Before the year ended, the North China People's Government had
given way to the Chinese People's Republic, controlling all of China
except Taiwan and a few off-shore islands.
The legal, administrative and political history of the People's Re-
public of China since 1949 is as complex as its prehistory. Drastic
changes of policy, shifts in legal theory and legal practice, tensions and
direct conflict between different views and groups are constantly to
coming the fore. The period from 1949 to 1952, the period of the New
Democracy and the Common Program, preached a revolutionary
united front line meant to reassure all those prepared to join the new
order, but also emphasized popular participation in revolutionary jus-
tice for the purpose of smashing the old order and making clear who
the new masters were and that their power reached everywhere. It was
a period of revolutionary expropriation and of the consolidation of
power, manifested through a series of drastic campaigns that shook
China: the Land Reform Movement, the Resist America and Aid Korea
Campaign, the movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionar-
ies and the "Three-Anti" and the "Five-Anti" campaigns, as well as a
host of more minor movements. All this involved the intense politiciza-
tion of law and of all legal measures, as well as the open use of terror
against selected sections of the population-landlords, alleged counter-
revolutionaries, bureaucrats and others. During this period, as in the
Soviet Union under Stalin, there was great emphasis on law as a
weapon of class rule and class defence. There was, however, much
greater emphasis in China than in Stalin's Soviet Union on informal,
but party-controlled, on-the-spot action by the masses. Moreover,
there was tendency to attribute all shortcomings to the Kuomintang.
The Three-Anti Campaign of 1952 gave great prominence to com-
plaints of alleged wide-spread bribery, corruption, miscarriages of jus-
tice due to incompetence, and violations of legal norms. The Govern-
ment chose to attribute these shortcomings to the continued influence
of Kuomintang attitudes and of Kuomintang-trained personnel in the
judicial apparatus. It called for a cleansing of judicial cadres and judi-
cial work. The Judicial Reform Movement was promptly launched and
lasted from August, 1952 to April, 1953. Newspaper articles throughout
13. Id. at 11.
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the country estimated that 6,000 of the 28,000 judicial cadres had been
former members of the Kuomintang or member of its Youth Corps and
Secret Police. These 6,000 were charged with being depraved, law-vio-
lating elements, continuing their criminal activities, bringing old judi-
cial concepts and styles of work to the new courts, and corrupting even
the old party cadres. Legal concepts such as the separation of law from
politics, the equality of all persons before the law, the independence of
the judiciary, statutes of limitation and the bar against retroactive ap-
plication of law, as well as the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, were
held up as aiding landlords and counter-revolutionaries at the expense
of the people. The judicial cadres that brought these concepts to their
work were responsible for the low esteem in which the masses were
said to hold the courts and for the failure of the courts to serve actively
the central political tasks of the country.
While this campaign was going on, however, Chinese policy and
discussion turned from the task of revolutionary expropriation to the
need for socialist construction (on the Soviet model). The first Five-
Year Plan for the Economy was inaugurated in 1953; in April of that
year, the Second National Conference on Judicial Work called for the
strengthening of judicial work and the judicial system, the training of
more cadres and the creation of more courts and conciliation commit-
tees. Newspapers and journal articles began to proclaim the virtues
and social importance of the law-abiding spirit and call on Party mem-
bers to set an example in strictly observing the law. China's first State
Constitution, consisting of four chapters and 106 articles, was formally
promulgated on September 20, 1954. A day later the Provisional Regu-
lations concerning Courts, the Procuracy and Peoples Tribunals were
replaced by the Law of the People's Republic of China Governing the
Organization of the People's Procuracy of the PRC. Regulations on Ar-
rest and Detention were enacted on December 20,1954.
The Constitution, although emphasizing the leading role of the
Communist Party and the importance of the mass-line, enshrined
much more definitely than any previous Chinese communist enactment
some conception of the separation of judicial and administrative func-
tions, of the rule of law and the guarantee of legal rights and of the
independence of the judiciary. It did so within decided limits; it denied
any security of judicial tenure; it gave to legislature power to "super-
vise the work" of the Supreme Court; it created an ill-defined, ambigu-
ous relationship of "reporting to" between local courts and local peo-
ple's congresses; it did not specifically exempt the local courts, as it
exempted the local procuracy, from interference by local organs of
state. Both the Constitution and the Law Concerning the Organization
of Courts provided that "the people's courts administer justice inde-
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pendently, subject only to the law." (Article 78 of the Constitution,
Article 4 of the Court Law). The Court Law established a formal hier-
archy of people's courts of higher, intermediate and basic local courts,
with the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China
located in Peking [Beijing]. Basic courts had a duty to establish and
supervise the work of informal lay conciliation committees that dealt
with minor civil and criminal matters in factories, housing blocks, etc.,
to form legal reception offices accessible to the public and to carry out
various judicial administrative tasks. Legal Advisory Offices, estab-
lished as part of a system of "people's lawyers" which grew in impor-
tance in 1955 and 1956, took on notarial and advising func-
tions-though such people's lawyers were still poorly trained and far
too few in number. At a time when there were said to be 28,000 judicial
cadres in China, there were more than several hundred thousand
courts. Even in 1984, we lectured to several hundred serving judges
and judicial workers in Guangzhou (Canton) who had been brought
into a judicial cadre's training institute for six-month or two-year
courses to make up for their previous lack of legal education. Entry to
the school was normally after some years of judicial or legal work; the
judges, if not legally trained, had become eligible for appointment as
judges after five years of legal work, athat is in the procuracy, police,
public security bureaux, or attached to courts or in conciliation
committees.
The precise meaning and the practical value of the "judicial inde-
pendence" proclaimed by the 1954 Constitution can be-and in China
itself soon became-the subject of some dispute. The Constitution, the
Court Law and the Procuracy Law, although certainly not safeguarding
the independence of the judiciary, did seem to make an important if
subtle distinction between the courts as bodies administering justice
generally and the courts as collegiate benches reaching judicial deci-
sions in particular cases. In the former capacity, the courts were not in
any way independent. In the latter, however, at least in theory, they
were independent and their judgments could only be appealed or
quashed within the judicial system; at least until those judgments
reached the Standing Committee the National People's Congress. This,
as the Parliament of China, unified in itself the legislative, the judicial
and the executive functions. During the period of "legality" that lasted
up to the end of 1957, this concept of "judicial independence" and the
limitations on direct political control implied by the distinction drawn
above, became a matter of more than academic significance, attracting
supporters and influencing legal analysis and decision making. This
trend, however, was overwhelmingly interpreted, even by its support-
ers, as not denying the overall leading role of the Party, the importance
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of popular participation in judicial work and the need for political
commitment by judges. Moreover, because China has relatively few
formally proclaimed laws and those that exist are vague, it was always
clear that judicial and legal personnel were expected to decide on the
basis of party policy, and more detailed day-to-day party directives
and campaigns.
The total structure and internal procedure of courts laid down by
the Court Law also showed a theoretical acceptance and development
of a substantial degree of legal formalism, a considerable weakening of
ad hoc arrangements and ad hoc revolutionary justice. They did imply
a re-interpretation of the Chinese "mass line" and of the concept of
"popular participation" in such a way as to limit their meaning consid-
erably and to institutionalize them, even if not rigidly, within a formal
legal system.
In the three years between the Second National Conference on Ju-
dicial Work held in Peking in 1953 and the Eighth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China held in 1956, the People's Republic
of China made its first sustained attempt to formalize, regularize and
to some extent further legitimize its system of social administration on
the basis of those features common to bureaucratic rationality and a
(very limited) Gesellschaft conception of the rule of law. The Septem-
ber, 1956 Congress, came in the middle of a new Party campaign to
induce intellectuals to offer their constructive criticism of the work of
State and Party in China-a campaign launched in May, 1956, under
the slogan "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let A Hundred Schools
Contend" and abruptly halted in July, 1957. The theoretical note
struck at the Eighth Congress and by most of the intellectuals and ju-
dicial cadres who spoke out during the Hundred Flowers period was
that China must now emphasize socialist legality and the rule of law,
and proceed with the creation of complete codes of law and with the
systematic elaboration of rules governing judicial procedure and other
aspects of legal work.
The lack of a systematic body of Communist Chinese legislation
making manifest the principles of socialist legality, combined with the
then political impossibility of appealing back to the Westernizing legal
reforms of the Nationalist Revolution, caused the technical lawyer and
the partisan of socialist legality in China to be thrown into a considera-
ble degree of dependence on Soviet legal models and Soviet legal text-
books. In 1954, at the opening of China's period of socialist legality,
recognition of the Soviet Union's role as the senior and most exper-
ienced Communist State was part of official Chinese Party policy. In
law and the organization of government, as in economic production,
the Soviet Union was taken as having reached a stage of development
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upon which the Chinese were only embarking. The Soviet Union had
observed and administered fully or partly socialist codes of law, social-
ist court procedures and socialist concepts of law for more than 30
years; for the same period, it had been building up, on the basis of its
experience, a socialist legal science and textbooks of law. The condi-
tions in China were in many respects significantly different from those
obtaining in the Soviet Union. Chinese "legalists" did not intend, or
expect to be able, to transport Soviet laws and Soviet procedures on to
the local Chinese scene in a mechanical way, without making any sig-
nificant changes or any intelligent selection of the relevant law. Faced
by constant and gaping !acunae in their own law, however, they did go
to Soviet codes, Soviet procedures and Soviet texts for guidance. The
Lectures on the General Principles of Criminal Law in the People's
Republic of China, prepared in the absence of any criminal code by the
Institute of Criminal Law Research at the Central Political-Judicial
Cadres' School in Peking and completed in April, 1957, could only be
understood in the context of Soviet legal theory and Soviet legal devel-
opment. The names of the people cited in the frequently homely illus-
trations in the text are given as Zhang and Li; the principles illustrated
were the principles applicable to the understanding of Soviet codes and
elaborated in Soviet textbooks. Very rarely did the Peking Lectures
attempt to connect these principles with Chinese Communist legisla-
tion; only in the final section on punishment was there a significant use
of Chinese legislative material and ministerial instructions. The ar-
rangement and topics of the lectures-with their distinction between
objective and subjective aspects of offences, with their discussion of
kinds of intention, kinds of fault, and types of defences under the stan-
dard Soviet headings, and with their treatment of the stages in the
commission of an offence-immediately suggested to the informed
reader the distinctive Soviet reworking and simplification of German
civil and criminal jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century. Under-
standable in the circumstances, the need to rely on the fruits of Soviet
experience made the proponents of legalism in China vulnerable when
Sino-Soviet relations suddenly deteriorated.
The delay in, and ultimate non-consummation of, the proposed
program of systematic legislation, especially on civil and criminal mat-
ters, robbed the proponents of the rule of law in China of any firm
basis in the formal legal-administrative edifice. At the same time, the
Chinese had been confronted throughout by strongly countervailing
trends enshrined in Party policy and at least equally legitimated by
the Constitution. The primacy of social policy (in practice, the primacy
of the Party) and the authoritarian principle of democratic centralism,
which form the foundation of domination-submission in the society,
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could not seriously be challenged. They were reinforced by a complex
and powerful system of horizontal and vertical political, procuratorial
and judicial supervision, and by the language and tradition of Commu-
nist ideology throughout the world, bluntly but accurately expressed in
a Joint Directive of the Supreme People's Court and the Ministry of
Justice issued on December 10, 1954:
The enforcement of dictatorship and the protection of democ-
racy are the two inseparable aspects of the basic mission of the
people's courts. The work of the judiciary must be made to
serve the political mission of the State. During the transitional
period, the judiciary's general task is to safeguard the smooth
development of socialist construction and the socialist transfor-
mation of the State. The people's courts must not only punish
people but also educate them. They must carry out their
proper functions to serve socialist construction and the central
task of the State through the medium of judicial activities. 14
Then, in one of those dramatic shifts so characteristic of modern
China, the Hundred Flowers discussions were suddenly stopped from
above. Things said during the discussions were used as the basis for
the Anti-Rightist Movement launched in July, 1957, and followed by a
purge of "rightist" intellectuals and judicial cadres, denounced in the
most fearsome terms. Calls for the rule of law and questions about de-
lays in legislation were now evidence of "rightism." The draft criminal
code, according to reports, had been discussed by the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress on June 28, 1957, and was to
have been distributed to delegates of the Congress; the civil code, ac-
cording to reports, was almost ready at the same time. No more was
heard of either. Instead, between September and December, 1957, a
significant proportion of China's most prominent jurists, including the
President of the Criminal Division of the Supreme People's Court, Jia
Qian, and three other members of that court, four members of the
Standing Committee of the Congress, high officials of the government
legal bureau, the Ministry of Justice, the Procuracy, local judicial de-
partments, and leading professors and members of research institutes
were exposed as "rightist" with reactionary and anti-socialist views.
Rightist cadres were removed from their posts-a purge that seriously
affected judicial work at all levels and replaced the products of law
schools with demobilized military personnel and public security offi-
cials. The purges of judicial cadres in 1952 were again held up as a
model for the relationship between law and politics and as correctly
14. Renmin Ribao [hereinafter People's Daily], Dec. 11, 1954 (Peking edition).
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emphasizing the class character of law. The Government and Party re-
verted to a number of practices prominent before 1954 and rejected by
the rightists: they again allowed non-judicial bodies to handle many
kinds of cases, both civil and criminal, and gave the public security
forces renewed power to impose serious sanctions, such as rehabilita-
tion through labour and controlled production. The reconstituted judi-
cial cadres were put through an intense course of ideological training,
criticism and self-criticism and was reinforced, for them and for the
population generally, by a chorus in the press explaining the "real"
significance of the judicial independence guaranteed by Article 78 of
the Constitution and emphasizing the commanding position of the
Party in the judicial as in all other areas.15
Radical as this Anti-Rightist campaign was, it formed one aspect
of the great Chinese upheaval of 1958, symbolized by the concept of
making China take a Great Leap Forward in the economy. This Great
Leap Forward was accomplished by massive collectivization in agricul-
ture; self-reliance in industry in politics and social life; by elevating
revolutionary morality and the thought of Mao Zedong above all else.
The claim was that faith could move mountains and that moral dedica-
tion could bring China to a true and ultimate egalitarianism superior
to any other human society and, indeed, this goal was to be attained
within the foreseeable future. In such true Communism, toward which
China was allegedly moving rapidly even though her economy was ac-
knowledged to be backward, the mass line and direct popular partici-
pation would be triumphant. Law, bureaucracies and distinctions of
knowledge or education would have no role. The Party, as a mass or-
ganization of the people, would stand, in every respect, above the state
and the people would make their own history. All this was expressed in
the slogan "Smash All Permanent Rules, March a Thousand Li a Day"
and in the anarchic violence and disorder of the Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution inaugurated in 1966, in which Mao and his Gang of
Four let the young loose in a three-year campaign of terror against all
"establishments"-educational, judicial, governmental and Party.
Hundreds of thousands of those who had gained education or exper-
tise, who had lived abroad, who had relatives outside the country or
who had come from educated families, were beaten and humiliated,
often tortured, "struggled" against and then "sent to the country" to
"learn (humility) from the people" by performing agricultural labor.
To end the terror, when it threatened to get out of hand, many of the
Red Guards who had campaigned, "struggled" and sent others to the
15. See also Tay, supra note 6, for a more detailed account of developments in this
period.
19861
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
country-arbitrarily exercizing powers of arrest, imprisonment, search
and punishment-were themselves sent to the villages after 1969. Be-
cause the Red Guards were largely drawn from schools and tertiary
institutions, this effectively deprived a whole generation of Chinese of
serious education in their teens. Schools stopped awarding diplomas
and "put Marx before marks;" tertiary institutions, especially in such
suspect areas as law, were closed down in large numbers. 6 Even in
1973, when these schools gradually began to operate again, they often
had a staff-student ratio of one to one, that is, about 150 students and
150 staff per university. There were no textbooks and no real concep-
tion of the line the schools should adopt, until the proper discussions
had been held.
Only with the death of Mao in September, 1976 and the fall of the
Gang of Four a month later, was the primacy of mobilizational ideology
over everything, including technical competence and the rule of law,
finally repudiated. If there was a New China established in 1949, an-
other-ideologically and in many practical respects almost as
new-was established in the years from 1979 to 1986. Of course, it
must be remembered that general communist principles and sympa-
thies have not been abandoned. On the contrary, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party remains a Leninist structure with pervasive social control
and centrality of the state. There has been, however, a renaissance of
communist themes, popular during the mid-1950's. These themes had
been denounced as "rightist" during the Cultural Revolution but now
have been re-embraced and greatly developed.
For a country under effective and pervasive communist rule for
over thirty years, China-until 1978-had laid little more than the
sketchiest of foundations for a legal system and the rule of law. For
much of that period, it elevated Mao's 1957 speech "On the Correct
Handling of Contradictions," which distinguished contradictions
among the people from contradictions between the people and their
enemies. The former should be handled by mediation and conciliation,
persuasion and education. Only in the latter was law necessary, and
then it needed to be punitive law, an exercise of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Here, despite Mao's strong anti-Confucianism and the to-
16. For a fuller account of these developments and their bearing on law, see Tay,
Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, Mobilization and Administration: The Future of Law in
Communist China, 1 AsIA Q. 257-303 (1971); reprinted in A.R. Davis & Bonnie S. Mc-
Dougall, The Proceedings of the 28th International Congress of Orientalists: The Role
of Law in Asian Society (1974) and Tay, Smash All Permanent Rules: China as a Model
for the Future, 7 SYDNEY L. REv. 400 (1976). Both articles predicted that Maoist anarch-
ism would have to give way to bureaucratic-administrative regularization and legalism in
the interests of modernizing China.
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tally different justification he would give his position, there was indeed
a harking back or latching on to more traditional Chinese conceptions
and procedures, symbolized by the distinction between 1i and fa. Be-
tween 1949 and 1965, a number of "model" laws, such as the Marriage
Law, the Law of Land Reform, the Regulations on Punishment of
Counterrevolutionaries, Regulations on Penalties for Corruption, the
Law of Agricultural Tax and the Law of Industrial and Commercial
Tax, were promulgated. There was, throughout that period, no general
civil or criminal code of law, no law of civil or criminal procedure and
no commercial code. Of course, there were discrete regulations, instruc-
tions and directives, many of them not published. Altogether, accord-
ing to the Chinese Official Yearbook for 1983/84" some 1,500 statutes
were proclaimed in the period from 1949 to 1965 by China's state or-
gans, including ministries directly under the State Council which con-
stitutes China's Government." Between 1958 and 1975, the 1954 Con-
stitution was neither repealed nor observed in practice or in theory.
Rather, it was simply ignored. Western radicals liked to portray China
in much of that period as a society of mass action, mass decisions and
spontaneous grassroots politics and justice, but no one should under-
rate the sheer volume and detail of pieces of paper-instructions, pol-
icy directives, definitions and clarifications-circulated to millions of
cadres as guides to action. The vast majority were marked for "Internal
use only." China, between its intermittent campaigns, was a very bu-
reaucratic society, only not a legalistic one.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is often dated by West-
ern observers as having taken place from 1966 to 1969, when the entire
country was in violent upheavel and only institutions protected, for
one reason or another, by the State Council and the People's Libera-
tion Army were immune from mob violence and Red Guard "investiga-
tion." As late as 1973, however, when violence had definitely been
halted and closed institutions were being reopened, it was not clear
whether the general ideology of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
17. See CHINA OFFICIAL YEARBOOK 1983/84 (1983) (hereinafter CHINA YEARBOOK).
18. The Council now consists of a Premier, two Vice Premiers, eleven Councillors of
State (some of whom are also Ministers), a Secretary-General, forty Ministers in charge
of ministries or commissions, the Presidents of the People's Bank of China, of the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences and of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the audi-
tor-general (all of whom have the rank of Minister). The State Council is the highest
organ of state administration. Its members are appointed and can be removed by the
President of the People's Republic of China who, together with the Vice President, is
elected by the National People's Congress, China's highest organ of state power. This,
with its Standing Committee, exercises the legislative authority of the State and elects,
among others, the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Procurator-General
of the Supreme People's Procuracy.
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tion, shorn of its violent excesses, had been repudiated, even though
President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 had meant a significant relax-
ation in China's relations with the West. Indeed, the present leaders of
China, date the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
from 1966 to the fall of the Gang of Four in October, 1976, one month
after the death of Mao. They can point to the Anti-Confucian cam-
paign of 1973, with its general anti-intellectual message, and above all
to the second Chinese State Constitution promulgated on January 17,
1975, which insisted in its preamble that there are "classes, class con-
tradictions and class struggles, there is the struggle between the social-
ist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist resto-
ration and there is the threat of subversion and aggression by
imperalism and social-imperalism" throughout the long historical pe-
riod of socialist society and that these contradictions can be resolved
"only by depending on the theory of continued revolution." Indeed,
that Constitution, although general, heavily ideological and containing
only thirty articles, reaffirmed most of the central tenets of the late
Mao's vision for China, for example: people's rural communes as ad-
ministrative units, revolutionary committees studying Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong thought, firmly putting proletarian politics in com-
mand, insisting on collective productive labor by cadres at all levels,
commending and guaranteeing the masses' right to hold great debates
and write big character posters. Judicial organs, dealt with in one arti-
cle of three short paragraphs (article 25), were to be responsible and
accountable to people's congresses at the corresponding levels; the
functions and powers of procuratorial organs were to be exercised by
the organs of public security at various levels; the mass line was to be
applied in all judicial work and hearings; and in major counter-revolu-
tionary criminal cases the masses were to be mobilized for discussion
and criticism.
In April 1976-during the Qing Ming Festival at which Chinese
traditionally honor the dead-mass, unlicensed demonstrations turning
into riots took place in the Tian An Men Square, honoring the memory
of Premier Zhou Enlai and not very obliquely denouncing Mao Zedong
in the guise of the book-burning Emperor Qin Shi Huang who had
scholars buried alive. The Party Central Committee in response con-
demned the "Right Deviationist" call to reverse "correct" verdicts
passed during the Cultural Revolution and branded the Tian An Men
incident as counter-revolutionary. On October 6, 1976, however, Mao
having died, four prominent leftists-Mao's wife Jiang Qing, the Cul-
tural Revolution's ideologist Yao Wenyuan, the Vice Premier and
strategist for the mass violence and street fighting of the Cultural
Revolution Zhang Chunqiao and the Shanghai worker-rebel leader
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Wang Hongwen-were taken into custody in Beijing. With others, they
were accused of plotting armed rebellion, of inciting violence, of fram-
ing innocent people, including President Liu Shaoqi and other State
and Party leaders, and plotting to assassinate Mao Zedong. The Cen-
tral Committee's verdict on the Tian An Men incident was reversed
within a year. In the next two years, hundreds of thousands of "Right-
ists," denounced and persecuted as such from 1957 onward, were being
cleared and rehabilitated as victims of an illegal frame-up. A year later,
the Party Central Committee decided also to remove "designations"
and the consequential loss of civil rights and social opportunities from
landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements, ex-
cept for those who had refused to mend their ways. Although not un-
justly "designated," the official line ran, those groups had experienced
twenty to thirty years of reform through labor and had become labor-
ers earning their own living. By the end of 1984, civil rights had been
restored to some twenty million people, the Party said, and only 195
who "refused to mend their ways" remained "designated." Outside ob-
servers believe the figure was probably nearer thirty million. Many of
the "Rightists," after terrible suffering, humiliation and exclusion from
all intellectual work, were moved back into positions consistent with
their knowledge, skill and earlier experience; virtually all of them, as a
result of their first-hand experience of the repressions and humiliations
of the period from 1958 to 1976, are among the strongest supporters of
the new course for China set from 1977 onward.
The fall of the Gang of Four in practical terms meant the
reemergence of Deng Xiaoping and the policies he had always stood
for-those of pragmatic flexibility summed up in two of his famous
sayings: "It doesn't matter whether the cat is white or black as long as
it catches mice" and "Seek truth from facts." The new course was and
is seen in China and outside as principally his creation and resting on
his prestige and authority.1 ' Deng's opportunity was based on the
19. Deng was born in Sichuan Province in 1904. As a young man he studied and
worked in France and the Soviet Union. He returned to China in 1926. He became a
Communist guerrilla commander, joined Mao in Jiangxi (Kiangsi) and took part in the
Long March. He held important military commands in the anti-Japanese war and the
civil war and important party posts after 1949, becoming Secretary-General of the party
until he was denounced as a revisionist in 1967. At that time the post of Secretary-
General was abolished. Deng, who had sought to moderate Mao's excesses in economic
policy, especially in agriculture, disappeared, but resurfaced in 1973 to take over the
reins of leadership from Zhou Enlai who was fighting cancer. The Gang of Four schemed
to have him overthrown again, and, in 1976, succeeded in blaming Deng in part for the
April 5th riots in Tian An Men Square. Their arrest in October signalled Deng's victory.
Since then, he has become and remained the effective leader of party and goverment. He
is by no means secure from revivals and opponents, but since 1977 Deng has been in a
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widespread revulsion from the anarchy and vicious violence of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its assaults on people, tradi-
tions and all aspects of private life ("fight the four olds"-old thinking,
old culture, old customs and old ways of living). It was also based on a
similar revulsion from the sillier excesses of the cult of Mao, an the
constant hectoring and extra hours of political education and discus-
sion imposed on a weary labor force, on the growing dissatisfaction
with and economic crisis in agricultural production, on similar failures
in the industrial and service sector (especially in the provision of basic
industrial goods and services for the people, now described as the im-
balance in the economy and on the great loss of morale fostered by
Mao's grandiose and economically harmful schemes, beginning with
the mass collectivization of the Great Leap Forward. Many now admit-
ted and said publicly, that Mao's policies from 1958 onward, had led to
disaster. A fundamental and overall reform of the economy would be
required and for this reform changes in political, educational and ad-
ministrative policies were also necessary. The change came rap-
idly-though in its initial phases it was still based on or marked by
compromise positions insisted upon by the Party Chairman and Mao's
chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, himself known as a past Leftist who
had quarrelled with the Gang of Four when he leapfrogged, over their
backs into Mao's favor. Deng's power was not fully consolidated until
September, 1980, when Hua Guofeng was demoted from the post of
President (Premier) of the State Council in a series of moves culminat-
ing in the elevation of Hu Yaobang, an unqualified supporter of Deng's
new course.
Essentially, that new course has consisted in rejecting the Maoist
position that Cultural Revolution and class struggle are central to
China's building of socialism. Instead, Deng elevated the need for so-
cialist construction on the basis of four modernizations-those of agri-
culture, of industry, of national defence, and of science and technology.
In all of these, he said, contrary to Mao's grandiose claims, now ex-
posed as falsifications, China was lamentably backward. Major reforms
of the economy and administration were needed to raise production, to
introduce flexibility and responsiveness and to get goods to the people.
These reforms were quickly launched. The role of intellectual labor, of
education and research was seen as crucial to these developments and
elevated as having the same importance as physical labor. Mao's anti-
Malthusianism was dropped and a vigorous (some would say brutal but
basically successful) policy of population control was introduced to
achieve drastic reduction in fertility. Minority nationalities were given
position to dismantle many of Mao's policies and to steer a new course for China.
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more formal autonomy and more public respect as having contributed
to Chinese culture and the history of China. In agriculture, the polit-
ico-administrative functions of the communes, controlling every aspect
of the peasant's life, were dissolved; prices for the compulsory state
purchases of eighteen staple commodities were raised to improve the
peasants' living standard; a "responsibility" system of payment accord-
ing to production was introduced in agriculture and is now being intro-
duced in industry through wage-reforms on the principle of "to each
according to his work" and greater power for managers to transfer, de-
mote or fire. An increasing number of peasants were permitted to lease
land, form collectives and to work as households-that is, in effect as
private farmers, obliged to deliver a contracted quantity of their crop
to their collective, but free to sell the rest on a genuinely free market
for which the government provided both ideological backing and mate-
rial infra-structures (designated marketplaces in towns etc.). The much
publicized success of this form of privatized agriculture and the large
incomes this system has produced for many peasants and "specialized
households" (breeding and marketing fish, chicken, etc.) have been
hailed as a major contribution to feeding the people and to increasing
agricultural production. Similar reforms are now under way in indus-
try, an area in which centralized planning (the command economy) is
being limited to heavy industry and other appropriate enterprises. De-
centralization and response to market forces by more autonomous
managements are being encouraged in the light industry and service
sectors. In service and small manufacturing sectors, private enterprise,
like private restaurants, are now permitted, and indeed encouraged.
Private owners are permitted to employ labor, though the permissible
scale of such enterprises has still not been decided and seems, at pre-
sent, to be limited to from six to thirty employees. Irksome and eco-
nomically counterproductive restrictions such as the prohibition on
peasants using mechanical transport to move goods belonging to house-
holds or the proscription against spending spare time fishing have been
totally removed. Investment in light industry and the service sector has
been increased. Special arrangements to attract foreign investment and
foreign expertise have been and are being made through legislation to
permit and encourage joint ventures with foreign individuals and en-
terprises, the creation of four Special Economic Zones and the opening
of Hainan Island to foreign investment, followed by the designation of
fourteen coastal cities as special development zones with distinct rules
and arrangements meant to create better conditions for foreign invest-
ment and economic and technological exchange. Provincial govern-
ments have been permitted and encouraged to create trade and eco-
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nomic links with foreign countries and investors more directly.20
All this, as a tourist can see immediately, has revolutionized life in
China. There is no doubt that Deng Xiaoping's policy has been to seek
results by introducing the maximum flexibility and increasing respon-
siveness to the market into a rigid command economy which previously
had put all the emphasis on heavy industry and grain-production. This
command economy had been a singular failure since 1958, and proved
completely inadequate to improve the lives of the people. Deng Xiaop-
ing's policy has also been to encourage foreign investment and expert
foreign help from the West. Both policies have their opponents and
their critics in China, especially in the cities, and their fate depends on
how successful they prove economically.
Although the pace of reform has been dramatic, initially it had to
proceed with some caution. Deng has made it clear that the reforms do
not mean that China is abandoning the socialist road. The primacy of
the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the correctness of
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the centrality and over-
whelming importance of the State and a collective economy based on
public ownership of the means of production remain. The rejection of
20. For the full English and Chinese texts of the Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ven-
tures (promulgated and effective on July 8, 1979) as well as Procedures for Registration
and Administration, Provisions for Labor Management, the Handling of Loans by the
Bank of China, Laws and Rules regarding Income Tax, Foreign Exchange Control and
the Control of Resident Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises and Regulations
and Provisions Governing the Special Economic Zones in Xiao Guangdong Province, see
I CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (China Publications Centre 1982) and COM-
MERCIAL LAWS AND BUSINESS REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (V.F.S.
Sit ed. 1983). Chinese authorities refer to more than forty legislative acts relevant to
foreign investors passed since 1979 and concerning such matters as Chinese-foreign joint
ventures, the exploitation of offshore oil, taxation of foreign enterprises, organizations
and individuals in China, labor management, administration of industry and commerce,
foreign exchange control, customs, import and export commodities inspection, banking
and credit, trademarks, patents, and special economic zones. Xiao Yongzhen, Legislation
Firmly Holds Open China's Doors, 43 BEIJING REV. 16 (1984). The first volume of
CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION, supra lists twenty-four such acts. The Hong
Kong publication exceeds forty pages by including, most valuably, circulars, notices,
property insurance clauses and many regulations not specifically directed at foreigners or
foreign enterprises. Some disquiet has been caused among foreign investors, however, by
the subsequent realization that these publications were "secret" directions and regula-
tions (i.e., for "internal circulation only") governing the powers and policies of the Chi-
nese contracting parties which might affect ultimate interpretation of the contract or
agreement. There will be more disquiet when it becomes generally known that a secret
ruling of the Beijing Supreme People's Court in 1986, circulated for internal use only,
laid down that the current Chinese State Constitution cannot be cited or appealed to in
court proceedings. The Court through the Constitution promulgated policies and guide-
lines which became legally operative only through further detailed legislation.
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capitalism generally also remains because it is viewed as a system of
exploitation. But Marx, writing in the nineteenth century, although
still viewed as being generally correct, is now seen as not providing
correct guidance to all the problems of the twentieth century. In par-
ticular, his view that commodity production, that is production for a
market, would no longer exist in a socialist society has been found to
be incorrect.2 1 The Party and Deng Xiaoping have also been anxious to
denounce and limit bourgeois liberalization and dissent, and criticisms
that go further than the policies licensed from above. This became evi-
dent dramatically in January, 1987, after widespread student demon-
strations in favor of democracy. They were suppressed and criticized
and culminated in the dismissal of Hu Yaobang for alleged failure to
be firm enough with ideological slides into bourgeois liberalism.
All these drastic revisions of Party policy, of the interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, of administration, economic
regulation and educational and cultural policy, even of nationalities
policy and the introduction of a much more positive attitude to China's
past cultural achievements, have taken place in the last seven years.
At the First Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Party Con-
gress in August, 1977, the end of the Cultural Revolution was pro-
claimed, though its policies were still not repudiated. Deng Xiaoping
was elected a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and by Decem-
ber the Party Central Committee had elected Hu Yaobang to head the
Party's Central Organization Department. Under his leadership, it be-
gan to redress "unjust, false and wrong" condemnations of people
brought about under the guidance of leftist thought. The First Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress held in Beijing in February
and March, 1978, adopted a third state constitution, twice the length
of the 1975 Constitution, which still praised, in its preamble, "the tri-
umphant conclusion of the first great proletarian cultural revolution,"
still spoke of the great revolutionary movement of class struggle in the
period of socialist construction which China had entered upon, but also
put emphasis on the struggle for production and scientific experiment
and the need for modern agriculture, modern industry, modern na-
tional defence and modern science and technology by the end of the
century. The 1978 Constitution re-established the procuracy, required
the masses to be drawn into discussion only in regard to "major" con-
21. See, e.g., Su Xing, Understanding China's Socialist System, 47 J3EIJING REv. 18
(1984). The official view is that China's present, reformed and formalized legal system is
a socialist legal system because the economy remains based on socialist planning, the
preeminence of State and collective ownership, as well as the socialist aims of removing
epoitatis ad asTgr th potple's elfare. The so iaris ecnctio of the egal eYatem.
therefore, is to safeguard and promote this socialist economic base.
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ter-revolutionary or criminal cases and provided for supervision of the
work of courts only by the courts above them (and not by local peo-
ple's congresses at the corresponding levels). Events, as we have seen,
have moved so quickly that the shortlived compromise 1978 Constitu-
tion is not even included in the Chronicle of Major Events from Au-
gust, 1977 to August, 1982.22 In March, 1978, at a national science con-
ference, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the role of science and technology
in social development, pointed out that brainworkers in the service of
socialism are part of the laboring people and reiterated the necessity of
building up a mighty contingency of scientific and technological
personnel.
The great turning point in Party history came in the Third Ple-
nary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee held from De-
cember 18 through December 20, 1978. The Session repudiated the er-
roneous past policy of "the two whatevers," of resolutely supporting
whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and of unswervingly
following whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave. The scientific sys-
tem of Mao Zedong Thought (not repudiated, but no longer treated as
the singlehanded creation of Mao) had to be grasped comprehensively
and accurately; the mind had to be emancipated through the guiding
principle of "Seeking Truth from Facts." The slogan "Take Class
Struggle as the Key Link" was unsuitable for socialist society. The
Party instead needed to emphasize socialist modernization, to correct
the serious disproportionality in the national economy, accelerate agri-
cultural development, to give full scope to socialist democracy and to
strengthen the socialist legal system.
The Party, as we have seen, proceeded to do just that, "putting an
end to the situation in which the Party moved forward in its work, but
in a zig-zagging way, after the downfall of the Gang of Four."2 The
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the
People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R, long a dead letter, was
not extended beyond its expiration in 1979 and, on January 1 of that
year, China and the United States officially established diplomatic re-
lations. Since then, as part of China's new open door policy, relations
with Western countries, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit,
have steadily improved and grown in scope. These improved relations
include: provisions for foreign investment and for employment of for-
eign experts and managers in China; the expansion of technical, scien-
tific and cultural exchanges; and provisions for qualified and reliable
Chinese citizens to study abroad, privately as well as under govern-
22. See Cimuh YEARoo, stpra note 17, at 39-42.
23. Id. at 39.
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ment sponsorship. Academic degrees have been reinstituted and the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 1980
adopted regulations on academic progress, providing for master's and
doctoral degrees. Emphasis has been put on improving the quality of
middle school education and promoting specialization in vocational
schools at the middle level and tertiary institutions. Law has benefited
greatly not only from a general emphasis on higher education but also
from the general tendency to treat the law as an integral part of mod-
ernization, thereby achieving the status and support given to science
and technology.
The Fifth National People's Congress, met in five sessions from
February, 1978 to December, 1982, and successively adopted and
promulgated the third and fourth constitutions of the People's Repub-
lic of China. During the five sessions the People's Congress revised the
Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Gov-
ernments at Various Levels, the Organic Law of the People's Courts
and the Organic Law of the People's Procuracy, the Criminal Law and
the Law of Criminal Procedure, the Law of Nationality, the Marriage
Law and the Law on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment, as well as a series of other economic statte 4 The Standing
Committee of the Fifth Congress also promulgated such statutes as the
Regulations on Arrest and Detention and the Law of Civil Procedure
(Trial Implementation). The State Council set up the Ministry of Jus-
tice to take charge of judicial administative work.
The fourth and presently operative 1982 State Constitution 5 for-
mally enshrines and endorses the basic thrust of the Deng Xiaoping
reforms as set out above. It describes the basic task of the nation as
the concentration of effort on socialist modernization in industry, agri-
culture, national defense, science and technology (Preamble)." The
1982 State Constitution stresses the role of workers, peasants and in-
tellectuals, and the importance of a broad patriotic united front with
all patriots who support socialism. It emphasizes (Article 20) that the
State protects the development of the natural and social sciences, dis-
seminates scientific and technical knowledge, and commends and re-
wards scientific achievements and technological inventions.2 The State
24. Id. at 215-347. Many of these laws and regulations have also been published in
English in separate brochures, including the fourth State Constitution, Provisional Regu-
lations Governing Advertisements and the Law on the Protection of the Marine
Environment.
25. For an English translation of the 1982 State Constitution, see CHINA YEARBOOK,
supra note 17, at 216.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 221.
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Constitution further (Article 23) provides for the training of, special-
ized personnel in all fields who serve socialism, the increase of the
number of intellectuals and for the creation of conditions which give
full scope to the role of such intellectuals in the socialist moderniza-
tion. 28 Article 18 permits foreign enterprises, other foreign economic
organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter
into various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the
People's Republic of China.2 9 Articles 6 through 12 affirm the primacy
of the state economy and the collective economy and assign ownership
of all land between them,"0 These articles, however, permit working
people who are members of rural collectives, to farm, to own land allot-
ted for private use within the limits prescribed by law, to engage in
household sideline production and to raise privately owned livestock.
The articles describe the individual economy of urban and rural work-
ing people, operated within the limits prescribed by law and as a com-
plement to the socialist public economy. The lawful rights and inter-
ests of the socialist public economy are protected by the State, though
the State also "guides, helps and supervises the individual economy by
exercising administrative control." The right of citizens to own lawfully
earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property and to in-
herit private property, is guaranteed in Article 13.31 In administering
the economy of the system of socialist public ownership, the principle
of "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work"
is applied.
Article 5 provides that "the State upholds the uniformity and dig-
nity of the socialist legal system.32 No law or administrative or local
rules and regulations shall contravene the Constitution." Articles 33
through 56 set out the fundamental rights and duties of citizens which
include freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and demonstration, privacy of the home and correspon-
dence, and a guarantee of personal dignity against insult, libel, false
charges or frame-ups. 33 Citizens are also guaranteed the right make
complaints and charges against state functionaries, and a right to com-
pensation when they have suffered losses through infringement of their
civic rights by any state organ or functionary. Duties of a citizen in-
clude: observing labor discipline and public order; respecting social
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 219-20.
31. Id. at 220.
32. Id. at 219.
33. Id. at 224.
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ethics, safeguarding the unity of the country and the unity of all its
nationalities; practicing family planning within marriage; rearing and
educating children; supporting and assisting parents; paying taxes and
performing military service in accordance with the law.
The structure of the State (Articles 57 through 135, including thir-
teen Articles on the People's Courts and People's Procuracy) is set out
in more detail and with more care than in any previous constitution of
the People's Republic of China.34 Although local people's procuracies
are made responsible to organs of state power at corresponding levels
as well as to the procuracies at the higher level, the People's Courts
(Article 126) "shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power
independently and are not subject to interference by administrative or-
gans, public organizations or individuals."
Although there have been over thirty drafts since work on the
criminal code first began in the early 1950's the Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by
the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and coming into
operation on January 1, 1980,11 were the Republic's first. The Criminal
Law, which includes 192 Articles, begins its General Part by imple-
menting Marxism-Leninsim-Mao Zedong Thought as a guide and the
Constitution as a basis. The tasks of the Criminal Law are to "use
criminal punishment to struggle against all counterrevolutionary and
other criminal acts in order to defend the system of dictatorship of the
proletariat, to protect socialist property, property collectively owned
• . . and lawful privately-owned property, to protect citizens' rights of
the person, democratic rights and other rights, to maintain social or-
der, order in production, order in work, order in education and scien-
tific research and order in the lives of the masses of the people, and to
safeguard the smooth progress of the course of socialist revolution and
socialist construction" (Article 2). The Law proceeds to define types of
crime and criminal responsibility, criminal preparation, criminal at-
tempts at and discontinuance of a crime and joint crimes. The law
deals with the types of punishment (that are to be in accord with the
crime and range from "control," a form of probation "under the super-
vision of the masses," to the death penalty, which is to be applied only
for the most heinous crimes and which may be suspended for two years
to observe if reform through labor is having effect). The law also deals
with the concrete application of punishment. The special provisions of
the Law enumerate the main crimes under the following headings:
34. Id. at 226-39.
35. See THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1980); THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1980).
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counterrevolution; endangering public security; undermining the so-
cialist economic order; infringing upon the rights of the person and the
democratic rights of citizens; property violation; disrupting the order of
social administration; disrupting marriage and the family; and derelic-
tion of duty. Crimes within each group are defined clearly and maxi-
mum sentences are assigned. Article 79 provides that a crime not ex-
pressly stipulated in the Special Provisions of the Criminal Law may
be determined and punished according to the most closely analogous
article, but the matter shall be submitted to the Supreme People's
Court for approval. The crimes listed would not surprise or be ques-
tioned by any Western observer, though two provisions might raise a
smile and one some disapproval. Manufacturers or sellers of bogus
medicines, and sorcerers or witches, who use superstitution to engage
in the activities of rumor-mongering or the fraudulent conversion of
articles of property, commit an offense which can be punished by de-
tention; so does anyone who cohabits with or marries someone cleary
knowing the person to be the spouse of a member of the armed forces
in active service.
Both laws, then, organized along Soviet and Continental European
lines, are the sensible, reasonably fair codes of a socialist society that
sees most forms of harm caused to other citizens or the state as mat-
ters for criminal control by the state rather than civil action by the
individual harmed. Like the constitution that followed them, these
laws suggest that court proceedings are to be fair, in accordance with
law and not subject to political interference-though the function of
the law itself is seen as involving the protection of the political order.
The Criminal Procedure Law emphasized the distinction between the
function of the public security bureau, the procuracy and the courts.
China, however, has been suffering from an officially admitted,
and, indeed, publicized but also deplored crime wave. Official accounts
emphasize the frequency of armed assaults, rapes, kidnapping and rob-
bery, attributing these criMes to some degree to the lawlessness "intro-
duced" into Chinese life by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
In the light of a strong campaign against such crimes and against cor-
ruption, both the criminal law and the criminal procedural law have
been amended to increase punishments, to extend the list of crimes for
which the death penalty may be imposed and to shorten the periods
for which the carrying out of the sentence may be deferred to permit
appeal or reconsideration by higher authority. Recent campaigns
against crimes of violence have been accompanied by well-publicized
executions of groups of convicted criminals, sometimes as many as 300
in one district, within one short period.
Within a year of their promulgation, China's new criminal law and
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criminal procedure were to come to world attention in the trial of the
Gang of Four. It was a trial that dramatized for the Chinese population
the new supremacy of law, which sharply and deliberately sought to
distinguish between political errors-such as those of Mao-and crimi-
nal actions. On November 10, 1980, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao
Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen-by then denounced throughout China
as the Gang of Four who had both led Mao astray and done worse
things behind his back but under color of his authority. The Gang of
Four, along with six other principals allegedly forming the leadership
of the two Jiang Qing and Lin Biao "cliques", were charged, with, inter
alia, causing the death of 34,800 innocent people and the unwarranted
persecurtion of 729,511.36 The Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, in deciding on the prosecutions and setting up a
Special Procuracy and a Special Court for the purpose, made it clear
that the charges should involve only conter-revolutionary violations of
the criminal law and not "errors in work, including those related to
political line. ' 3" One of the special panels of judges that began hearing
the case in Beijing on November 20, 1980, and finally found all the
accused guilty, commented later:
One foreign writer remarked that the indictment read like a
"forest of names." To a foreigner it may look like that, but to
us Chinese who had been through those years, it is actually "a
sea of blood and tears. . . . " I must concede that as a member
of the panel of judges, I had at first thought it would be very
difficult to separate the errors of the "cultural revolution" from
the crimes committed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and mem-
bers of their cliques. They were so closely linked. But in the
course of the trial it became quite clear that we were dealing
with criminal liability, with people who had violated the crimi-
nal law, and not with political errors. Their offences included
plotting to overthrow the government and split the state, at-
tempting armed rebellions, having people injured or killed for
counter-revolutionary cliques, conducting demagogic propa-
ganda for counter-revolutionary ends, torturing people to ex-
tort confessions and illegally detaining and imprisoning people.
36. The indictment named six additional principal defendants who were deceased
and against whom no proceedings would therefore be taken because art. 1(5) of China's
Law of Criminal Procedure exempted deceased persons from criminal prosecution. Id.
37. A GREAT TRIAL IN CHINESE HISTORY: THE TRIAL OF THE LIN BIAO AND JIANG QING
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY CLIQUES, Nov. 1980-JAN. 1981, at 14 (1981) [hereinafter THE
TRIAL].
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All these were clearly defined as crimes punishable by law.3"
The trial of the Gang of Four-televised all over China-and the
verdicts finding them and others guilty were of the greatest practical
and symbolic significance in making clear that China was breaking
sharply with its most recent history and with all the "anti-rightist"
policies of the period from 1958 to 1976. The trial itself might be com-
pared with Khrushchev's speeches revealing the crimes of Stalin,
though Mao was not directly linked with the crimes of the Gang of
Four. The trial brought out the horrors that result from placing one's
actions above the law, and, moreover, it represented the insistence by
the new leadership that the law was the proper instrument for expos-
ing and punishing such corruption, criminality and "counter-revolu-
tionary" action. Yet at the same time, the trial was unquestionably a
show trial, bringing out some things and not others; not seriously ask-
ing whether the Gang of Four was really a Gang of Five which included
Mao. This is not to say that the trial was a frame-up in the Stalinist
mode, in which innocent people were charged with crimes that were
totally preposterous and bore no relation to what they actually did.
Nor were the accused, with the possible exception of Wu Faxian, the
broken automatons or eager self-incriminators of Stalin's show trials.
Whether they committed all the crimes they were found guilty of-for
example plotting to kill Mao or to raise armed insurrection-is still a
matter for speculation. That they planned to kill people, however, and
ordered people killed on trumped-up charges there is no doubt. The
official Xinhua (New China) News Agency on January 29, 1981, when
the verdicts had been brought down, asked a prominent Chinese jurist,
Professor Qiu Shaoheng, to give his impression of the trial-which he
attended-and published the following comments:
The trial of the Lin-Jiang cliques was fair. China's new Crimi-
nal Law which became effective on January 1 last year was cor-
rectly applied to the ten defendants. The importance of inves-
tigation and evidence was upheld and all defendants were
guaranteed the right to a defense. The judges played a rela-
tively active role in the Special Court, because under the Chi-
nese legal system they are freer to question the parties and wit-
nesses than are judges in countries following common law
traditions, such as England and the United States. The role of
38. Id. at 6-7. Fei Xiaotong is an American-educated and internationally known soci-
ologist who is now director of the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and remains a member of one of the permitted non-communist "democratic"
parties in China.
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the trial judge in China is to search for facts, listen to wit-
nesses, examine document and make further investigations if
he considers them necessary. This is similar to Continental law
methods practised in some European countries and is quite dif-
ferent from the procedure followed in most common law coun-
tries in which prosecuting and defense attorneys play the most
active role in finding and presenting evidence. The role of the
Chinese judge is, of course, guided by legal procedure which
expressly forbids the obtaining of evidence by threat, induce-
ment, fraud or other unlawful means. A defendant in a Chinese
criminal court is presumed neither innocent nor guilty. China's
Law of Criminal procedure is designed to ensure prompt and
accurate findings of fact and correct application of the law for
the purpose of punishing the offenders and protecting the in-
nocent from criminal liability. Stress is laid on evidence and
investigation, and a defendant's confession is not taken for
granted. The law stipulates that a defendant cannot be con-
victed and sentenced on the basis of a confession if there is no
corroborating evidence; but can be judged guilty and sentenced
without a confession if there is sufficient evidence to establish
guilt. During the trial, a majority of defendants admitted guilt
but Jiang Qing disrupted order in court while Zhang Chunqiao
remained silent throughout the proceedings. In these cases,
there was ample evidence to convict the defendants even
though they had not made confessions. All the defendants had
been given the right to defend themselves at the trial and to
have defense counsel if they wished, as provided by Chinese
law. Five of them did appoint defense counsel, while some de-
cided to argue on their own behalf. Zhang Chunqiao wanted no
counsel and sat mute throughout the hearings, though he was
urged many times by the presiding judge to make his own
pleadings. If there was anyone who deprived him of the right
to defense, it was he himself. The trial concluded on January
25 with Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao receiving death
sentences with a two-year reprieve and the others prison terms
ranging from 16 years to life. The evidence at the trial proved
that Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their cohorts had intended to
overthrow the people's democratic dictatorship through usurp-
ing supreme power. Such a plot, and the sinister means the
cliques employed, would be equally indictable crimes in any
other country. The attempted assassination of Chairman Mao
Zedong and the plot for an armed rebellion in Shanghai are
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ready examples of flagrant crimes.39
In 1973, when the authors' visited China and some of her universi-
ties, they were told that there were four law schools in operation there.
All of these schools had only recently resumed teaching, with a small
intake of first-year students, no post-graduates, no textbooks and great
uncertainty about the Party's position on law, legal education and the
correct Marxist view of the theory of law. Later in 1984, the authors'
found that thirty-one universities had active faculties or departments
of law, offering four-year courses in all the compulsory subjects and a
significant, but varied, range of options.40 Those faculties and depart-
ments, as part of the university system, come under the Ministry of
Education (recently reorganized as the Education Commission) or
under Provincial and Autonomous Region Governments. Five special
schools of politics and law, coming under the Ministry of Justice, have
been established at major centers to serve four to five provinces each
(that is, they draw their students from catchment areas of 200 million
people). They are the East China School of Politics and Law in Shang-
hai, the Central South (Zhongnan) Institute of Politics and Law in
Wuhan, the Southwest (Xinan) School of Politics and Law in Chongq-
ing, the Northwest (Xibei) Institute of Politics and Law in Xian and
the Beijing Institute of Politics and Law, re cently renamed the China
University of Politics and Law. In these Schools of Politics and Law we
were lecturing to as many as twelve hundred students spread over sev-
eral years and conducted seminars and discussions with up to 100
teachers and full-time graduate students. Law is also taught in schools
of accounting, economics, finance and foreign trade-the authors lec-
39. See THE TRIAL, supra note 27, at 147-48. Jiang and Zhang's death sentences were
subsequently commuted to life imprisonment, which they are both still serving. See gen-
erally Id.; D. BONAVIA, VERDICT IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR (1984), for
accounts of the trial.
40. The universities included, some old universities with prestigious law schools
before 1949, and many other new universities with only recently-established departments
of law. They were Anhui (Anhwei), Bei-da in Beijing, Fudan in Shanghai, Guangxi,
Guangzhou University in Canton, Hainan, Hankou, Hangzhou, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Ji-
angxi, Jinan, Jilin, Lanzhou, Liaoning, Nanjing (Namking), Nankai in Tianjin (Tientsin),
Neimeng in Hohhot (Capital of Inner Mongolia), the People's University in Beijing
(Renda), founded in 1949. But the most prestigious of the newly created universities are
Huaqiao University (for Overseas Chinese) in Guangzhou (Canton), Shandong, Shaanxi,
Shantou (Satow), Shenzhen (newly created in the Special Economic Zone on the border
of Hong Kong), Sichuan, Suzhou (Soochow), Wuhan, Xiamen (Amoy), Xiangtan (in Hu-
nan), Xinjiang, and Zhongshan in Guangzhou. According to a special report in the May
6, 1985, Beijing Review, they are now turning out some 3,000 graduates a year and em-
ploy 1,800 academic staff. The report puts the total number of law students in China at
14,300 or 1.2% of the nation's total university and college enrollment.
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tured at those shcools in Shanghai, Wuhan and Kunming-and there
are political-legal courses in training institutes for existing judicial cad-
res who did not receive full legal education. Normally, however, law
school is completed in four years. The compulsory subjects (with the
number of lecture and tutorial hours assigned to each) are: History of
the Chinese Communist Party (108), Philosophy (108), Political Econ-
omy (108), Chinese Language (180), a foreign language (288-compul-
sory for three years), Physical Education (144), Basic Theory of Law
(90), the Chinese Legal System (72), Chinese Constitutional Law (54),
Chinese Criminal Law (108), Chinese Law of Criminal Procedure (54),
Economic Law (72), International Law (54), Private International Law
(54), the Law Governing Criminal Investigation (54), Foreign Legal
Systems (72), History of Chinese Legal Thought (72), Logic (54), Ad-
ministrative Law (54), Labour Law (36), Environment Law (36), Fi-
nance Law (36), Patent Law (36), Legal Statistics (36), Public Security
(Police Work) (36), Legal Drafting (36), Evidence (36), Criminology
(54), Scientific Thought-Natural Science (36), Law Concerning the
Autonomy of Minority Nationalities (36), Maritime Law (36), Interna-
tional Law of Economic Contracts (36), and some practical work like
visiting the courts. Marginal courses, treated as compulsory in some
institutions, may be optional in others.
Optional courses vary somewhat from institution to institution,
and often the range of choice is very limited. These courses include
Western Legal Thought (72), Social Ethics (54), Sociology (54), Theory
of Government (54), History of International Relations (54), Foreign
Constitutions (54), Foreign Criminal law (36), Foreign Civil Law (54),
Foreign Criminal Procedure (36), Foreign Civil Procedure (36), Inter-
national Economic Law (59) and Advanced Foreign Language Instruc-
tions (108).
Textbooks for these courses-which are commissioned and ap-
proved by the Ministry after conferences and discussions with law
teachers throughout the country-have been in preparation for some
years and a number have only been published in the last year or so.
The fact remains, however, that there is still a serious shortage of
trained and effective law teachers. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the teachers that do exist are generally untrained and often
ineffective persons left over from the past who have a general lack of
experience in teaching courses which have only recently been devised.
Although there is student sentiment protesting against the bad and
overformalistic teaching, the heads of departments praise the new de-
centralization and responsibility system which gives them greater
power to reassign, demote and even suspend unsatisfactory members of
staff. Frequently, and in spite of what seemed to be topics which were
19861
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
politically sensitive, the authors were asked to lecture before large stu-
dent audiences and to lead discussions with the staff on such wide
ranging topics as the relationship between the university and the state
in Western countries, university administration, the allotment of power
to heads of departments, teaching methods and methods of assess-
ment, the case method and the autonomy of the university lecturer in
presenting his or her courses, reaching conclusions and persuading fac-
ulties or departments to initiate new courses.
Until very recently, legal theory and academic or quasi-academic
writing on law in the People's Republic of China seemed, to most
outside observers, vague, general, inconclusive and amateur-
ish-displaying little grasp of legal problems or of the history of legal
thought in general or of Marxist ideology in particular. Certainly, Chi-
nese legal writing was well below the level of Soviet writing and was
characterized by an absence of monograph literature and intellectual
analysis. Now there is active discussion and promulgation of systematic
laws. Those who have training and have been silenced have now re-
turned to active intellectual work. It is again possible to think .without
fear of denunciation as a "rightist." All this, coupled with the endless
conferences and discussions organized in the 1980s, have led to a re-
markable rise in standards, showing that the ability to think legally
was not absent in China but merely repressed. On such questions as
the nature, function and essence of law, the formal charcteristics and
social importance of a legal order, the historical development of law in
China, the nature of economic law and its relation to civil law, the rela-
tionship of law and modernization, and the relationship between law
and democracy, plausible and comparatively sophisticated positions
have been worked out. These positions are unquestionably derivative
from Soviet discussion and much less perceptive or interesting than
those to be found among Marxist, or allegedly Marxist, thinkers in
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. They are not, however, al-
ways inferior intellectually to the general orthodoxies of Soviet legal
thought and they are sometimes more flexible and interesting on some
issues. The Deng Xiaoping line indeed is, at present, producing a
greater appreciation of the comparative integrity of a legal tradition
and of its social role than orthodox Soviet thinkers display, even if
both Chinese and Soviet legal theorists still insist that the primary
function of law is the formation and protection of a particular social
order which it serves and not any abstract or independent conception
of justice."'
41. For an indication of the present vitality of legal theoretical discussion in China
and of the opening up of previously 'forbidden zones,' there is an excellent article co-
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Students, as in all countries, seem to range from the very able to
the limited. University teachers complain, as they do elsewhere, of the
inadequacy of middle school education and of the need to give many
students remedial classes in the Chinese language. The intense compe-
tition for places, however, and the enormous population pools from
which Chinese tertiary institutions draw their students result in very
striking intelligence among better students, even when their education
has been inadequate. Also, Chinese students work extremely hard.
Nevertheless, they are still, at least in most institutions, not as well
taught as they deserve to be-a fact recognized by the heads of most
departments and institutions. This fact was probably responsible for
the enthusiasm with which experienced and helpful foreign visitors and
experts are received by both students and staff.
The general impression that law schools make, at the moment, is
that of a hard-working and serious determination to train effective law-
yers, to widen the horizons of the young, and, in particular, to give the
best of them a chance to gain foreign experience, directly or through
books and lectures. The importance of law and the social contribution
that the legal profession makes to the building of socialism and to
China's modernization are now strongly stressed. But as the Provi-
sional Regulations for Lawyers of the People's Republic of China,
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's
Congress on August 26, 1980, stress in Article 1:
Lawyers are legal workers of the state whose duties are to give
legal advice to government agencies, enterprises, institutions,
public organizations, people's communes and citizens, in order
to promote the proper enforcement of the law and safeguard
the interests of the state and the collectives as well as the legit-
imate rights and interests of citizens.
Students, so far as the authors could tell, until last year (1986) over-
whelmingly saw themselves in this way-as servants of the State
charged with safeguarding and promoting social order and social mo-
rality, combatting crime and helping to educate the people into an or-
derly and law-abiding existence. Now, there is a marked shift in the
career ambitions of law students toward economic and commercial law
and working as legal consultants for "private" enterprises. It is in this
area, students and young lawyers say that they are most aware of state
authored by the distinguished Chinese legal scholar at Wuhan University, Han De-pei.
See Han Dei-pei & S. Kanter, Legal Education in China, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 543, 567
(1984). The authors emphasize the 'liberal' view in a series of debates that have since
been officially resolved in favor of a sophisticated compromise, at least for the time being
and for the purposes of the university textbook.
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pressure and that they can do most to help develop democracy in
China. Criminal law and practice no longer attract. There was great
interest, for example, among students in our description of the Com-
mon Law preference of safeguarding the innocent over the need to con-
vict the guilty, but we could sense no feeling that this was a right or
feasible course for China. The recent extensions of the death penalty,
the contraction of time to appeal, the number of executions actually
carried out as part of a strong campaign against major economic crimes
and the wave of violence and criminality that followed the disorder of
the Cultural Revolution met with general approbation, not criticism.
Students were very interested in, and perhaps quicker to grasp
than Australian students, the distinctions we drew between the adjudi-
cative Gesellschaft conception of law, the organic Gemeinschaft con-
ception of law found in traditional societies and, as we said, espoused
by Chairman Mao and the bureacuratic-administrative conception of
law. They themselves treated China as vacillating betwen Gemein-
schaft and bureaucratic-administrative conceptions, but as also requir-
ing Geselischaft type laws for economic relations with foreigners and
for aspects of the growing domestic individualized market economy.
They were also interested in many of the things that have become
trendy in the West, for example, the protection of the environment,
poverty law, rights of women, especially in domestic relations. Gener-
ally human rights were not discussed, except for the suggestion made
more than once that the international campaign for human rights ran
the danger of becoming a justification for interfering with the sover-
eignty of nations. The protection of minorities-despite the revised
and much more favorable nationalities policy adopted in the 1982 Con-
stitution-disturbs students rather than engaging their sympathies.
The chief point of interest though in the authors' lectures and dis-
cussions throughout China was the concept of economic law. Was it
simply a collection of disparate laws dealing with various aspects of the
economy and economic relations between people and between people
and enterprises; or was it, potentially at least, a coherent body of law
analogous to but different from civil law, concerned with systematically
and justly dealing with all economic relations, with the economy as a
whole? In China, as in similar discussions in the Soviet Union and the
Soviet bloc, where codes of economic law have had strong support but
have yet to be enacted, except in the German Democratic Republic,
law teachers were split sharply between those who thought that civil
law was the only coherent and systematic body to govern economic re-
lations and those who thought that China needed and must develop a
distinct economic law. One law teacher explained, after the authors
had delivered a lecture on Pashukanis and the distinction between hor-
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izontal legal relations and vertical administrative relations, that eco-
nomic law would have to provide for both and to that extent might
have a civil law component and an economic-administrative compo-
nent. These discussions or economic law, however, did not reveal a con-
sensus, in fact some participants expressed considerable skepticism.
Everywhere, however, we were asked to speak on economic law, invited
to new departments of economic law just established by university fac-
ulties and to new centers of economic law established by provincial au-
thorities. On an even more recent occasion in January, 1987, we found
that interest had shifted to administrative law, both as the protection
of individuals against official arbitrariness, and as control of adminis-
trative corruption and abuse of power. An administrative law division
has now been established in the People's Court.
The enormous intererst in and governmental support for economic
law is revealing. Part of Deng Xiaoping's program of modernization is
the deliberate contraction of the centralized plan and of the command
economy and command form of social administration in favor of decen-
tralization, greater autonomy for managers and administrators, and
considerable extension of individualized enterprise. All this, if the state
is to retain control of general trends without seeking to administer in
detail, requires a system of law-of much explicit law than China has
had in the past-and a system of courts and legal determinations that
can inspire respect and confidence. Law, in short, is the modern prag-
matic way of administering and such law is not the fa of the legalists,
striking terror in every citizen, demanding total obedience to the state,
but rather it is an exclusive framework of security within which people
can pursue their own interests, and, yet at the same time, build
socialism.
Deng Xiaoping's rule, and that of his supporters, is by no means
secure. There is in China a vast mass of low-level Party cadres, com-
mune administrators and busybodies generally who have lost power
and authority as a result of Deng Xiaoping's reforms. The reforms
themselves, economically, will benefit some and not others. They may
increase inequality between regions and between the able and the less
able. They may produce higher living standards and greater availabil-
ity of goods at the cost of job security, and encourage inflation and
greater dependence on and vulnerability to the world economic situa-
tion. If things go badly economically, there could be rising opposition
expressing itself as a return to the left line. Even without a dramatic
shift of power, however, the course of the Soviet Union from
Krushchev to Brezhnev should not be forgotten. What looked like
Krushchev's (always limited) liberalism, his emphasis on flexibility,
pragmatism, the law and decentralization, became the managerial "law
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is steering society" outlook of his successor Brezhnev, whose Russia
was more affluent but much less liberal than Krushchev's. The concept
of economic law is already seeing a struggle between those who see law
as having a substantial adjudicative component, as guaranteeing cer-
tain areas in which citizen can move freely, and those who see law as
totally managerial, as a means of steering and even shaping society.
Both trends are present in China. Deng Xiaoping, it is said, is closer to
the first trend. Peng Zhen, the powerful member of the Party Central
Committee, who also suffered from the Leftists, speaks of the need for
law, but he is much closer to the second trend. Compared with condi-
tions in 1973, however, let alone in 1967 or 1958, China is a far happier
place-and not only for lawyers.
